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Three Structural Changes for a
New System of International
Climate Change Mitigation
Agreements Based on the WTO
Model
ABSTRACT

Past policy approaches to achieving internationalclimate
change mitigation have restricted the means for achieving
mitigation to broad emissions caps. These policies have ignored
the true nature of the climate change mitigation problem and
have failed. This Note proposes a new design for a climate
change mitigation system. It begins by analyzing the basic
assumptions of the current cursory approach and by reviewing
structuralproblems with those assumptions. It then reviews the
successful World Trade Organization(WTO) model as a possible
alternative structure and uses realities of the climate change
problem to show why such an alternative could work in the
climate change context. This analysis suggests that three
structural changes to the current climate change mitigation
system would significantly improve the current approach.First,
the system should allow for incremental mitigation. Second, the
system should contain separate categories of agreements for
energy decarbonization, efficiency and conservation, and
naturalsinks. Finally, the system should allow for the separate
negotiation of certain issues within each category: basic
principles, maximum achievable emissions reductions of each
mitigation method, and "hog-trading"burden allocation. This
Note calls for the creation of the World Climate Change
Organization (WCCO) to facilitate and administer this
collection of agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Past and current international approaches to addressing climate
change have correctly focused on the policy goals of climate change
mitigation, but these approaches are fairly cursory and do not provide
adequate means for achieving that goal. Climate change mitigation
goals generally revolve around target atmospheric concentrations of
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carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq). 1 Thus far, international
approaches to addressing this goal have involved, with slight
variation, a total cap on global CO2eq emissions or an economy-wide
reduction of CO2eq emissions from some baseline level. 2 These
approaches have typically ignored the complicated realities of the
climate change problem and the variety of solutions required to
achieve the ultimate goal. 3 This strategy seems to be based on the
false assumption that the simplest and broadest policy is the best
policy, but has thus far failed to achieve climate change mitigation
targets, or indeed, to make any progress whatsoever toward those
goals. 4
It is time for the international community to abandon the failed
emissions cap method and initiate the debate on other potential
approaches. This Note argues that three structural changes in the
climate change mitigation system could help create a more viable
means of achieving climate change mitigation. It bases these
suggestions on the complicated realities of the climate change puzzle
and on an analysis of the successful World Trade Organization (WTO)
model. The first change separates the end goal of a specific target
atmospheric concentration of CO2eq from the immediate policy by
allowing for incremental greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction. Such a
policy is more viable in the immediate future and, moreover, partial
progress toward an end goal may represent tangible progress. 5 The
second change treats each of the three major methods for achieving
climate change differently. It is highly unlikely that any one magic
bullet will single-handedly meet any reasonable climate change

1.
E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC] WORKING
GROUP III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 38, 39 tbl.TS.2
(Bert Metz & Ogunlade Davidson eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
CO2eq
reductions
(discussing
publications anddata/ar4/wg3/en/contents.html
necessary to mitigation risk of climate change).
2.
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 4, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]
(describing commitments in terms of CO2eq emissions); United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess.,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Report of the Conference: CopenhagenAccord, 4, 6,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]
("taking note of' a commitment of economy-wide emissions targets).
3.
The approaches include the Kyoto Protocol negotiated under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See generally Kyoto Protocol,
supranote 2.
4.
See Scott Barrett, A Portfolio System of Climate Treaties, 4 (Harvard Project on
Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper No. 08-13, 2008), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ files/BarrettWeb4.pdf (discussing past unmet emissions
reductions goals and compliance challenges under Kyoto).
5.
See NicHoLAs STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
195 box 8.1 (2006) (showing that a decreased probability of various magnitudes of
temperature increases as the atmospheric stabilization level of CO2eq decreases).
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mitigation target. 6 The international community, therefore, will have
to employ multiple methods for reducing CO2eq emissions. 7 Each
method warrants different and separate international approaches
and agreements. The third change allows for separate negotiation of
certain components within each mitigation category. Determining
general policies for each category is a different issue than
establishing technical feasibility of various emissions reductions,
which is in turn a different issue than allocating the burden of such
reductions among the various nations.8 Separating certain
negotiations could significantly improve the feasibility of negotiation
success. The WTO model can provide insights for how each of these
structural changes might affect the international approach to
negotiations on climate change mitigation.9
With these structural changes in mind, this Note advocates for a
system of inter-related international agreements under and
administered by a new entity, the World Climate Change
Organization (WCCO). The idea of a collection of climate change
agreements has been advocated before by other scholars.1 0 The
difference here is that the present proposal explains how the
collection of agreements should be divided and why. The proposed
WCCO model would incorporate the current policies under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1 but
would supplement those policies a great deal. The new system would
allow the international community to conceptually and practically
separate the pieces of the puzzle the world can more conveniently
solve separately. Ideally, the WCCO would provide an umbrella
structure that establishes the ultimate climate change mitigation
target as well as incremental goals and then facilitates various
categories of agreements for individual methods for achieving the
goals. This new model would allow the international community to
come to an agreement more gradually, resolving what can be resolved

Nathan S. Lewis, Powering the Planet, ENG'G & Sci., no. 2, 2007, at 12, 19
6.
(showing the massive scale of changes required to meet the mitigation targets).
7.
See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 969 (2004)
(describing multiple currently available options to reduce emissions).
For example, it may be clear that a particular type of old, coal-fired
8.
electricity plant contributes to the problem, but it may be less clear whether a nation
should bear the cost of replacing it.
Much of the analysis of the WTO model covers the agreement structure
9.
shown in a chart on the WTO website. Understanding the WTO: The AgreementsOverview, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/
agrml._e.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
See Barrett, supra note 4, at 6, 9 (arguing for agreements that cover
10.
different sectors of the economy and different gases).
11.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCCJ.
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today and postponing outstanding issues, while preventing the
continual renegotiation of past issues.
Part II of this Note explains the background of the current
international climate change situation, including some basic concepts
of climate change science, and the policy goal of climate change
mitigation. Part III considers the history of international climate
change mitigation policy and considers some key reasons for the
structural failures in the current system. Part IV analyzes the WTO
model as a potential alternative to the present structure in the
climate change context. Part V proposes three major structural
changes to the present system-incremental mitigation, categories of
mitigation methods, and key negotiation components-as a way to
solve the problems with the present system. The section uses specific
insights into the climate change problem, such as risk profiles,12
climate change "wedges,"' 3 and political feasibility, to show why these
structural changes would improve the system. Finally, Part VI
proposes and outlines a new WCCO international climate change
mitigation system modeled on the WTO example to move past the
current stalemate. This Note then considers whether the proposed
system could fit under the umbrella of the existing UNFCCC and
determines that the first step toward the new system is to modify the
UNFCCC to make it more suitable as a multilateral umbrella treaty
that can administer the WCCO system.14
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MITIGATION POLICY

GOAL

A. Why Worry About a Little Climate Change?

Climate change is a term that describes alterations in global
weather patterns-such as temperature extremes, timing, and
distribution; humidity concentrations affecting precipitation and
drought; and other extreme weather events-averaged over time.' 5

12.
See STERN, supra note 5, at 195 box 8.1 (showing that the risk of
temperature increase shifts with various levels of atmospheric CO2eq). This Note uses
the term "risk shifting" to mean the gradual reduction in risk through achieving
various target atmospheric concentrations of CO2eq.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 968 ("A 'wedge' represents an
13.
activity that reduces emissions to the atmosphere that starts at zero today and
increases linearly until it accounts for 1 GtC/year of reduced carbon emissions in 50
years.").
14.
UNFCCC, supra note 11.
See John P. Holdren, President & Dir., Woods Hole Research Ctr., Meeting
15.
the Climate-Change Challenge, Eighth Annual John H. Chafee Memorial Lecture on
Science and the Environment (Jan. 17, 2008), in 8 MEETING THE CLIMATE-CHANGE
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These changes can range in seriousness from slightly alarming to
catastrophic. 16 Scientists measure and express these alterations in
terms of changes in the global average surface temperature. 7
Policymakers seeking to address climate change are generally
concerned about the already-measured, and predicted future, increase
in the global average surface temperature, or "global warming,"
which is attributable to increased carbon dioxide (C02) and other
GHGs in the earth's atmosphere.' 8 These increases are often
expressed together as "CO2eq" or "C02 equivalents."' 9 GHGs, or
gases that contribute to the "greenhouse effect," function in the
atmosphere like glass on a greenhouse-they allow heat to reach the
surface of the earth in the form of light, but they prevent heat from
escaping the earth in the form of infrared rays.20 Atmospheric levels
of CO2eq have increased dramatically since the industrial revolution,
causing this greenhouse, the earth, to store more heat.2 ' While

CHALLENGE 6 (2008) (offering a definition of climate change). Professor Holdren argues
that "global climatic disruption" would be a more appropriate term for the phenomenon
than the "climate change" misnomer. Id. at 5. There is some variation in the precise
meaning of the term "climate change." Under the UNFCCC, "climate change" means
change in climate attributable to human activity, as opposed to climate variability that
occurs naturally. See UNFCCC, supra note 11, art. 1 para. 2. But the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change uses the term to mean any statistically
significant variation in climate due to any cause. See IPCC, 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 4 (2004), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/lOth-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf. This Note adopts
the former definition.
16.
See, e.g., Holdren, supra note 15, at 10-11 (describing changes ranging
from the weakening of monsoons to the drying of the Amazon).
17.
Id. at 6.
18.
"Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is evident from
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures," IPCC,
CLIMATE
CHANGE
2007:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
72
(2007),
available at
http://ipcc.ch/publications-anddata/ar4/syr/en/spm.html [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007]. "[T]he increase in global average temperatures ... is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic [human-caused] GHG concentrations." Id. at
39. Moreover, "[c]ontinued GHG emissions ... would cause further warming and
induce many changes in the global climate during the 21st century." Id. at 45; see also
Al Gore, Op-Ed., Moving Beyond Kyoto, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at 13 (expressing
concern about C02 emissions causing an increase in global temperature and discussing
political challenges of moving beyond the Kyoto Protocol).
19.
See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets and MacroTransformation:An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 303, 305 (2009) (describing atmospheric GHG levels in terms of "CO2eq").
20.
See The Greenhouse Effect and Greenhouse Gases, WINDOWS TO THE
UNIVERSE, http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/climate/greenhouse-effect gases.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (providing a very basic description of the greenhouse effect).
21.
For example, the atmospheric levels of C02, the most significant cause of
climate change, have increased from about 280 parts per million (ppm) before the
industrial age to 379 ppm in 2005. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 37;
see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 194 (1997), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/reports/
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natural forces can explain some of the change in atmospheric
CO2eq,2 2 scientists know that most of the increase, especially with
regard to C02, is caused by human activity. 23
Climate change inevitably affects many aspects of the earth's
systems on which humanity depends. Scientists predict that climate
change could cause disruption of ecosystems, shifts in crop
productivity, sea level rise, higher concentrations of air pollution and
infectious disease, shifts in precipitation causing both drought and
flooding, and morbidity-level heat waves. 24 Of the predicted changes,
the potential for a rise in sea level is perhaps the most alarming.25 A
commonly cited estimate for potential sea level rise ranges from 0.59
feet to 1.93 feet above 1990 levels by the year 2100; however, this
estimate does not account for potential rise caused by the melting of
Antarctica or Greenland, so the upper bound for sea level rise could
be much higher. 26 Scientists have already observed increased global
average temperatures, sea level rise, increased frequency of extreme
weather events, and significant melting of glaciers.2 7 Some recent
changes in climate patterns, such as the extreme winter events in
North America and Europe, may be part of this phenomenon.28 These
changes have the potential to displace millions of people, destroy

1997/index.html (noting that global atmospheric levels of C02 went from 280 ppm in
the eighteenth century to 360 ppm in 1997); Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 968
(noting that C02 "is the dominant anthropogenic greenhouse gas").
22.
See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 41 (comparing
contributions of anthropogenic and natural forces to changes in the global climate).
23.
This is because the type of C02 found increasing in the atmosphere during
a parallel increase in human-caused emissions lacks a carbon-14 molecule, which
matches the type of carbon found in human-burned fossil fuel. Holdren, supra note 15,
at 8.
24.
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supranote 18, at 48-51.
25.
See Holdren, supra note 15, at 9-10 (explaining that the rate of sea level
rise in the last decade has been twice the average for the 20th century and that this
and other changes are already causing harm).
26.
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 45 tbl.3.1 (listing a
potential sea level rise range of 0.18 meters to 0.59 meters). See also Holdren, supra
note 15, at 9-10 (noting the accelerated melting of Greenland and of the permafrost);
Lewis, supra note 6, at 17-18 (explaining how melting of the permafrost would release
trapped C02, causing a non-linear feedback effect that would increase global
warming).
27.
See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 30-31, 33 (describing
the observed effects of climate change). Scientists believe that recent extreme winter
weather is also attributable to the climate change phenomenon. See Justin Gills, Cold
Jumps Arctic 'Fence,' Stoking Winter's Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at Al
(describing extremely cold winters in North America and Europe at the same time as
unusually warm winters in Canada and Greenland, and explaining that "a pattern of
atmospheric circulation that tends to keep frigid air penned in the Arctic has
weakened," which may be linked to global warming patterns).
28.
Gills, supra note 27.
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complex ecosystems, and profoundly disturb the world economy. 29
Significantly, once the changes begin, they may be irreversible. 30
While highly partisan public skepticism about the existence of
climate change currently affects American politics, 31 the bulk of the
science indicates that the warming phenomenon is quite real.3 2
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
the degree of scientific certainty that climate change is happening
and that human activity is causing it has increased over the past
couple decades to a very high level of certainty. 33 The National
Academy of Science reviewed the IPCC's results at the direction of
President George W. Bush and independently confirmed the panel's
conclusions.34 Reports issued by the U.S. government itself
acknowledge that climate change is happening.3 5 Researchers have
tested and challenged the science behind climate change in many
ways, yet no legitimate scientist has shown serious doubt that climate

29.
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 48.
30.
Id. at 53-54.
31.
See Brandon Keim, The Psychology of Climate Change Denial,WIRED (Dec.
9, 2009, 1:29 PM) http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/12/climate-psychology
(discussing the politics behind climate change denial).
32.
See, e.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 72 ("Warming of
the climate system is unequivocal .... ); Holdren, supra note 15, at 7 (stating that
"[t]he Earth is getting hotter").
33.
See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 27, 72 (defining 'very
likely' to mean at least 90 percent confidence level and noting that "[miost of the global
average warming over the past 50 years is very likely due to anthropogenic GHG
increases"); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 5 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/ publications/otheripectar
("There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last
50 years is attributable to human activities."); IPCC, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT:
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, at 22 (1995), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climatechanges-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf ("The balance of evidence
suggests a discernible human influence on global climate."). The World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) created
the IPCC in 1988 to provide comprehensive and objective information regarding the
state of knowledge on climate change, possible impacts of climate change, and potential
response strategies to any such climate change. Organization, History, IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.chlorganization/organizationhistory.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011);
see also News and Outreach, Publications and Data, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011)
publications and datalpublicationsanddata.htm
(explaining the IPCC publication process, including government reviews).
34.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 4, 22 (2011),
available at http://www.gcrio.org[NRC/NRCclimatechange.pdf (noting that climate
change is most likely due to human activity and would have "serious adverse societal
and ecological impacts by the end of this century").
35.
See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 21, at 194 (noting that global
atmospheric levels of C02 went from 280 ppm in the eighteenth century to 360 ppm in
1997).
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change is happening or that it is caused by human activity. 36
Scientific researchers, who always seek to prove other scientists
wrong, have a huge incentive to expose flaws in the climate change
science; the lack of scientific doubt is thus especially poignant.
Climate change is clearly occurring and it is caused by CO2eq in
the atmosphere, but it is less clear what amount of climate change
will occur at various levels of atmospheric CO2eq. 37 Scientists do
know enough to be able to express the uncertainties in terms of risk
probabilities for varying atmospheric levels of CO2eq.38 For example,
there is a 99 percent chance that the global average temperature will
increase at least 2 degrees Celsius (oC) if the atmospheric level of
CO2eq reaches 550 parts per million (ppm), but there is only a 7
percent chance that it will increase 5oC at the same level. 39 Thus,
while there is certainty about the phenomenon of climate change,
there is less certainty as to the degree of catastrophic change that will
result from it.

B. Climate Change Mitigation as an InternationalPolicy Goal
This Note accepts as a given that the policy goal of global climate
change mitigation through CO2eq targets is optimal and analyzes
potential policy strategies in terms of this goal. Conceptually, there
are two major types of responses to the climate change problem:
mitigation, which means preventing or reducing the amount of
climate change that will occur, and adaptation, which means
reducing the potential harmful impacts of climate change by
protecting people and cities. 40 Of course, there is always a third
possible response: do nothing and suffer.4 1 Presumably, adaptation
strategies and suffering in the wake of failure to act will vary
depending on the amount of mitigation achieved. 4 2 These strategies
are covered elsewhere and are not addressed in this Note.43 The most
commonly discussed mitigation strategy involves reducing human-

36.
E.g., id. at 193-97 (verifying CO2eq emissions and concentration data,
verifying increases in global average surface temperature, and providing no data
contrary to the IPCC's findings).
37.
See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18.
38.
See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 318 tbl.1 (citing Nicholas Stern,
The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1, 5 tbl.1
(2008)) (describing the likelihood of exceeding various temperature increases for
different stabilization levels of CO2eq).
Id.
39.
40.
Holdren, supra note 15, at 13.
41.
Id.
See id.
42.
See, e.g., id. (noting that mitigation, adaptation, and suffering are
43.
interdependent strategies).
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caused CO2eq emissions to keep the atmospheric concentrations
below some specified level in order to prevent more than a safe
amount of global average temperature change.44
The target atmospheric concentrations should be set at a level to
limit the global average surface temperature change to a level that
will prevent "catastrophic climate changes," including high sea level
rise, droughts, and other catastrophic weather events. 45 Many
entities, both governmental and private, have articulated a goal of
2oC over pre-industrial levels, which would require a stabilization of
atmospheric CO2eq at about 450 ppm. 46 Scientists believe that such
stabilization will adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic changes,
but even at this level, the risk of catastrophic climate change is
significantly higher than the risk that one's house will burn down. 4 7
As of 2006, the level was already around 430 ppm, up from the preindustrial level of 280 ppm. 48 Given the scale of this increase and
continued development around the world, a CO2eq target level of 450
ppm may be impossible to achieve. 49 Some scholars and policy
designers have begun to look at a 550 ppm or even a 650 ppm
target.5 0 Such increased targets may seem arbitrary, but even the
higher targets can significantly decrease the risk of catastrophic
climate change to a degree where the benefits of meeting these
targets could be worth the effort.5 1
If the atmospheric concentrations are to remain below the 450
ppm level, scientists estimate that the developed, or "Annex I,"
countries must reduce emissions by 25-45 percent by 2020 and by
85-90 percent by 2050.52 These numbers are based on a percentage
reduction from some base level emissions rate, usually established for

44.
Even a group of financial investors responsible for $15 trillion in assets has
pushed for climate change mitigation to avoid a financial crisis. Neela Banerjee,
InternationalInvestors Issue Global Warming Warning, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, at
B5.
45.
See, e.g., Holdren, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing for a target of 2*C because
the severity of consequences would grow rapidly thereafter); Vandenbergh et al., supra
note 19, at 305 (noting that many governmental and private parties have argued for a
target of 2*C).
46.
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 305.
47.
Id. Some already think this level is impossible to achieve. Id.
48.
Nicholas Stern, Editorial, The Economics of Climate Change, Bus. DAY,
Nov. 2, 2006, at 13 (S. Mr.).
49.
See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 315-17 (discussing some of the
significant difficulties of meeting this target).
50.
Id. at 306, 317.
51.
Id. at 318 tbl.1.
52.
Sujata Gupta et al., Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements,
in IPCC WORKING GROUP III, supra note 1, at 776 fig.13.7. "Annex I" countries are
those that were listed as developed countries in the UNFCCC. See UNFCCC, supra
note 11, Annex I.
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a particular year.53 These reductions apply generally to all countries,
regardless of whether the country in question is a developing or
developed nation. 54 For the purposes of this Note, the exact reduction
requirements for each country are not important. The basic concept is
that climate change mitigation policy seeks to reduce the risk of
catastrophic climate change by meeting a specified target maximum
atmospheric concentration of CO2eq through significant reductions of
human-caused CO2eq emissions at the same time as energy demand
is expected to increase.5 5
This Note focuses on achieving the climate change mitigation
policy goals through comprehensive, international, multi-lateral legal
action. 56 While CO2eq emissions are produced locally, the physical
nature of GHGs is that they disperse across the globe and affect the
entire world.57 Therefore, an international solution is necessary to
58
prevent a classic tragedy of the commons problem. This Note does
59
though legal policies that
not focus on private global action,
facilitate such private action could, in theory, be part of the policy
architecture proposed by this Note.

See Gupta et al., supra note 52, at 776 (showing percentage reductions from
53.
a 1990 baseline level).
Id.
54.
IPCC WORKING GROUP III, supra note 1, at 99; Holdren, supra note 15, at
55.
13.
Most international legal policy also focuses on this strategy, though the
56.
methods for doing so and mitigation targets vary. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art.
3(1) (requiring Annex I member countries to reduce aggregate CO2eq emissions);
CopenhagenAccord, supra note 2, at 4-5 (agreeing that participating countries should
take various steps toward mitigation).
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, paras. 1-3.
57.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
58.
1243-48 (1968) (explaining the classic example of a tragedy of the commons).
Currently, some countries contribute more than others to total global emissions. The
exact distribution shifts depending on how one looks at the data, but the Unites States'
share is large under any method of viewing the data. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES REPORT tbl. 3 (2007), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html (showing U.S. contribution to C02
emissions at 20.3 percent of world totals in 2006, with European contribution at 15.3
percent, and Chinese contribution at 20.7 percent). Both developed and developing
countries are expected to increase emissions dramatically in the next few decades.
Lewis, supra note 6, at 15-16.
Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to
59.
Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. SCl. 18,452, 18,452
(2009) (addressing private global action on CO2eq emissions reductions through the
role of corporate governance and the supply chain).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ACTION AND THE CURRENT
MITIGATION STRATEGY

While no attempt at international climate change mitigation has
yet achieved an ultimate mitigation goal, 60 policymakers have made
some attempts at doing so and some frameworks are already in place.
These policies generally reflect a choice to pursue a "cap" approach. 61
In hindsight, the approach has not worked and should be abandoned.
But before moving on, it is important first, to understand how the
existing model works and second, to understand what key failures
can have immediate implications for designing a new model.
A. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
After the IPCC issued its first assessment report in 1990,
explaining the human-induced greenhouse effect and predicting
future climate change, 6 2 195 countries, including the United States,
adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). 63 Under the UNFCCC, nations recognized that
the global climate is a shared resource affected by GHG emissions
and agreed to seek "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system."64 The UNFCCC
obligates parties to pursue climate change mitigation as a policy goal
through international negotiation but does not set any specific
numeric limits on GHG emissions or establish any means to achieve

60.
See supranote 21.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
61.
62.
See IPCC, IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT 52 (1990), available at
http://ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/IPCC_1990 and_1992_Assessments/Englishlipec-90-92assessments-overview.pdf.
63.
Status: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIll.aspx?&
src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg-no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2011).
64.
UNFCC, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 2. Countries also committed to gather
and share information on how to deal with climate change, and to launch national
strategies for dealing with climate change and their impacts. Id. art. 4. While the
United States has not implemented many of its UNFCCC commitments, the United
States participates in ongoing negotiations and publishes a report required under the
treaty. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002: THIRD
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2002). See also UN

Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/ international unfccc.html (last updated Apr.
14, 2011) (describing the annual inventory of GHG emissions prepared pursuant to
U.S. obligations under the convention).
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mitigation. 65 Essentially, the UNFCCC is an umbrella treaty that
contemplates further treaties to specify the means of emissions
reduction.6 6
In 1997, member nations signed another treaty, the Kyoto
Protocol, which was negotiated under and linked to the UNFCCC. 7
The core of the Kyoto Protocol is the obligation that participating
counties meet binding GHG reduction targets.6 8 Generally,
participating countries agreed to reduce overall global GHG
emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 baseline levels during the
commitment period that ends in 2012.69 Various countries have
committed to varying portions of the global reduction, although
70
developing countries are mostly exempted from the reductions.
Interestingly, the protocol also creates a "carbon market" through
which countries can trade emissions rights,7 ' giving participating
countries the flexibility to "reduce" their own emissions by purchasing
emissions reductions of another country.72
The general reasoning behind the Kyoto Protocol and the
subsequent debate is fairly straightforward.73 The policy goal,
established through the UNFCCC, is to cap global atmospheric
concentrations of CO2eq at a level sufficient to reduce the risk of
catastrophic climate change. 74 A target goal is set at around 550 ppm,

UNFCCC, supra note 11, art. 4.
65.
IPCC WORKING GROUP III, supra note 1, at 99; see also UNFCCC, supra
66.
note 11, art. 4.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2. The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol,
67.
but never ratified it. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President
2001), available at
Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html
(noting that both China and India, two high-emitting countries, are both entirely
exempted from the Kyoto Protocol, which is why the Senate was unwilling to endorse
the Protocol); S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted) (advising the Clinton
Administration not to commit to binding limits without a commitment from certain
developing countries).
68.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
71.
The Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/ items/1673.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
72.
Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Designing the Post-Kyoto Climate
Regime: Lessons from the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, at xi
at
available
report),
interim
2008)
(unpublished
24,
(Nov.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edulfiles/nterimReportO8l2O3Akikov6.pdf.
73.
Most of this explanation is the author's own interpretation. For a similar
interpretation, see Barrett, supranote 4, at 1,.
74.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 2(3) ("The Parties .. . shall strive to
implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize
adverse effects . . . of climate change .... .").
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which is considered technically feasible. 5 It is not clear that any
debated reduction actually achieves the 550 ppm target, 76 but
assuming this reduction is possible, the rest of the solution is a
simple math equation. Kyoto simply allocates the necessary
reductions to various countries and leaves the details to each
individual country.77 This concept is conceptually simple and gives
each nation tremendous flexibility in achieving its portion of the
obligation.78 But in the end, the Kyoto Protocol has accomplished very
little toward the climate change mitigation goal, and it expires in
2012.79
According to their obligations under the UNFCCC, nations
continue their ongoing climate change mitigation negotiations.8 0
Negotiators travel to exotic places like Bonn, Tianjin, and Cancun in
search of a new international agreement on climate change
mitigation.8 ' For all the success the negotiators have had, perhaps
they have earned the "giant travelling circus" title that one observer
used to describe them.82 Arguably the biggest success so far was the
Copenhagen Accord, a legally unenforceable political agreement in
which certain countries agreed to "take note of' a reduction
obligation.8 3 Current negotiation attempts appear to be following the
Kyoto Protocol model of specifying specific GHG emissions limits to

75.
Though 450 ppm is preferable, it may not be achievable, while a higher
level of 750 ppm could be truly catastrophic. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at
318.
76.
See id. at 315 n.54.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art 3(1), Annex B.
77.
78.
See id.
79.
Id. art. 3(1) (establishing an end to the commitment period of 2012).
See UNFCCC, supranote 11, art. 4.
80.
The Carbon Footprint of Climate Change Delegates (NPR radio broadcast
81.
Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
130384209.
82.
Id.
See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, pmbl, para. 5 ("[n]oting" the results
83.
of the working groups, but agreeing to no binding commitments); Decision 2/CP.15
(stating that the Conference of the Parties "takes not of" the Copenhagen Accord). The
United States' portion of the Copenhagen Accord GHG reductions is 17 percent below
the 2005 baseline level. David Bielo, U.S. Commits to Greenhouse Gas Cuts Under
SCl. AM.
(Jan. 29, 2010), available at
Copenhagen Climate Accord,
http://www.scientificamerican.comlarticle.cfm?id=us-commits-to-greenhouse-gas-cutsunder-copenhagen-accord (explaining that the United States agreed to cut emissions to
4 percent below 1990 levels and also noting that the Copenhagen Accord is nonbinding); Michael Wara, Obama Offer at Copenhagen - 17 Percent, ENVTL. & ENERGY
INSIGHTS (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edulenrlp/2009/
12/08/obamas-offer-at-copenhagen-17-percent/ (noting that 4 percent below 1990 levels
is equivalent to 17 percent below 2005 levels). If successful, this would still not achieve
even the Kyoto goal of 5 percent below 1990 levels. See supra note 69.
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achieve a specified target mitigation goal.8 4 Negotiations also appear
to be going nowhere and stand little chance of achieving the climate
change mitigation goals.85

B. How the Current MitigationStrategy Failsto
Reflect the True Nature of the Problem
Other scholars have pointed out endless reasons for the failures
of the current strategy, including the unwillingness of participating
nations to commit even to vague obligations." This Note focuses on a
few specific aspects of the climate change puzzle not adequately
accounted for in the current approach. With the benefit of hindsight,
analyzing these missteps can have immediate implications for
designing a new model of international climate change mitigation.
First, the current model appears to underestimate the
gargantuan scale of the task of reaching climate change mitigation
targets.8 7 To understand the scope, consider what it would take to
reach a reasonable target by 2050 through changes in energy alone,
88
which accounts for 65 percent of total global GHG emissions. By
2050, the expected world population of 10 billion, combined with
economic growth, indicates that the total global energy demand could
increase from 12 terawatts (TW) in 1990 to 28 TW in 2050.89 To reach
90
0
a 450 ppm CO2eq target, the target associated with the 2 C goal,
during the same period of time would require all of the new energy
demand-plus a fair portion of the existing energy demand-to come
from completely carbon free sources. 9 ' Even achieving the less
desirable 650 ppm CO2eq target would require 15-20 TW of carbonfree power by 2050, which is more than all of the world's 1990

84.

See John M. Broder, Global Climate Change Talks Begin in Cancun, N.Y.

TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2010, at A12.
See id. (noting a pessimistic outlook on any breakthrough developments to
85.
come out of the Cancun negotiations).
As one article notes, the Kyoto Protocol does not restrain some of the
86.
world's largest emitters, either because these high-emitting nations did not ratify the
treaty, because the obligations are generous, or because there is no enforcement
mechanism. Aldy & Stavins, supra note 72, at xi. As another points out, negotiators
gave the Kyoto Protocol non-binding obligations, no effective enforcement mechanism,
and very little incentive for signing parties to participate at all. See Barrett supra note
4, at 4; supra note 67 and accompanying text. If the United States had committed to
the Kyoto Protocol, it would have committed itself to binding obligations, but achieved
very little in return.
See Lewis, supra note 6, at 16 (graphically showing the amount of clean
87.
energy necessary to meet various mitigation targets by 2050, assuming a "business as
usual" projection of future energy consumption needs).
See STERN, supra note 5, at 171 box 7.1 & fig.7.1.
88.
Lewis, supranote 6, at 15--16.
89.
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 306.
90.
Lewis, supranote 6, at 16-17.
91.
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demand. 92 Consider what sources could possibly provide all this
carbon-free power. To achieve the 650 ppm CO2eq target through
nuclear energy alone would require "the addition of a new, standardsized (1000 megawatt) nuclear power plant every day for the next
fifty years, in addition to substantial increases in efficiency and
conservation."93 To achieve the same target through solar energy
alone would require "installing twenty-seven square kilometers of
solar cells every day" for fifty years. 94
The magnitude of the mitigation task does not mean it cannot be
done, but it does shed 'some light on the wisdom of trying to
accomplish this feat through a single international agreement. It is
hard to imagine a nation that would be willing to commit itself to
such a giant obligation all at once when other policies of the moment
may seem more pressing.9 5 An even bigger concern for these nations
is the possibility of making the wrong choice. The Kyoto Protocol, for
example, includes a mechanism where more developed nations could
offset their own emissions reduction requirements by funding clean
energy projects in developing nations.9 6 But it turned out that this
mechanism provided a way for nations to maneuver around the
system, technically meeting obligations but not actually reducing
emissions. 97 If nations commit themselves to a more binding but
cursory policy that still does not work effectively, it could mean that
they will spend tremendous amounts of money on another ineffective
policy that achieves nothing toward the climate change mitigation
goal. Another major problem with such a large-scale task is that the
cost of opting in to the regulation regime could be remarkably high.9 8
Nations should have the option of opting in at a price that they can
digest. The proposed WCCO model could help resolve these problems.

92.
Id. at 18 ("So stabilizing at 550 ppm [C02] will then require about 15 to 20
terawatts of carbon-free power in 2050."). Lewis's estimate is roughly equivalent to 650
ppm CO2eq. IPCC WORKING GROUP III, supranote 1, at 39 tbl.TS.2.
93.
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 306.
94.
Id.
95.
Rebecca Lefton, Shortsighted Budget Conversations Mean Cuts to Climate
Assistance, HumanitarianAid, and DisasterResponse, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept.
13,
2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/climateaid.html
(suggesting that other issues of the day, such as budgeting will take precedence over
climate change).
96.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
97.
Barrett, supra note 4, at 1, 5. The economic cost of mitigation is one of the
major barriers to current climate change negotiations. See id. at 4 (noting that the
primary deficiency in the Kyoto regime is its lack of economic-based incentives for both
participation and compliance).
98.
See e.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, at 62 (noting that the
economic impact of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment could be as much as a 2
percent reduction in GDP for some countries).
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A second piece of the climate change puzzle inadequately
accounted for in current models is climate change risk profiles, which
essentially leads to a misunderstanding of the nature of what climate
change is supposed to achieve. Climate change mitigation policies
essentially seek to reduce the risk of "dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system."9 9 Recall that the various
anticipated temperature increases basically summarize predicted and
potentially devastating changes in the world climate system.1 0 0 But,
as Nate Lewis points out, "[iut's hard to make predictions, especially
about the future."1 01 Because of some scientific uncertainties built
into the models that correlate global atmospheric levels of CO2eq
with global average temperature increase, the risk of temperature
change shifts with varying target atmospheric levels.1 02 For example,
the likelihood of a 20C increase is 78 percent at a target atmospheric
level of 450 ppm CO2eq, 99 percent at a target level of 550 ppm
CO2eq, and 100 percent at a target level of 650 ppm CO2eq.103 But
the likelihood of a more devastating 50 C temperature increase is 1
percent at a target atmospheric level of 450 ppm CO2eq, 7 percent at
a target level of 550 ppm CO2eq, and 24 percent at a target level of
650 ppm CO2eq.' 0 4 Recall also that it is not entirely clear how
catastrophic a particular temperature increase would be-only that
the greater the increase, the greater the catastrophe. 0 5
The lesson to learn from these risk profiles is that it is probably
no longer possible to eliminate the risk of climate change, only to
reduce it.10 6 And any significant reduction would reduce the risk.
Debates over whether a 750 ppm atmospheric concentration of CO2eq
is a safe target or whether a 450 ppm is an achievable target miss the
point. These debates let the perfect be the enemy of the good. A policy
that simply reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of catastrophic
climate change would still meet the policy goal of climate change
mitigation.

UNFCCC, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 2.
99.
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, pt. 1.
100.
Lewis, supra note 6, at 15.
101.
See supranote 38.
102.
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 318.
103.
0
Id. At a 5 C increase, ice and snow may disappear around the world and
104.
sea levels could rise ten meters or more. Id.
105.
For example, it is unclear whether the West Antarctic Ice Sheet will melt,
causing additional sea level rise. Holdren, supra note 15, at 13.
106.
This is because it is no longer technically feasible to reach even the 450
ppm target in which there is still a significant risk of a 2'C increase. Vandenbergh et
al., supra note 19, at 305-06, 318 (noting that most policy architectures do not even
purport to achieve a 450 ppm target and explaining the extremely aggressive
assumptions required to even suggest meeting such a target).
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The third problem inherent in the design of the current system is
that it fails to provide practical answers about how to achieve
mitigation. Participating nations are merely obligated to reduce GHG
emissions by a certain amount.10 7 The Kyoto Protocol is agnostic as to
how nations meet the obligation. 10 8 For that matter, so is the climate,
but that does not make it good policy. The UNFCCC only has broad
and general guidance. 0 9 The omission of specific instructions for how
to reduce GHG emissions provides participating nations with
maximum flexibility. This makes a lot of sense in theory, but ultimate
flexibility remains problematic.
Flexibility has not led to a broad and innovative array of ways to
meet climate change goals. 110 Most nations have not met their
climate change goals and some have announced that they do not plan
to meet them."' Nations like the United States cannot even decide on
a domestic policy to address the climate change problem.1"2 The
current debates are bogged down with questions of who bears more
responsibility; China wants the developed world to make more
dramatic emissions cuts and to shoulder some of the financial burden
for the developing world while the United States wants China and
the developing world to bear more of the burden."13 Rather than talk
about the how, parties seem to get stuck on the allocation, making
the entire solution politically infeasible.

107.
See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 2, art. 3(1).
108.
See id. (requiring only that countries not exceed their assigned amounts in
the aggregate).
See UNFCCC, supra note 11, art. 2 (offering only the nonspecific concept of
109.
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations" as a means toward the broad goal of
"prevent[ing] dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system").
See Barrett, supra note 4, at 4-5 (noting, in particular, that although it
110.
makes some sense to express the targets in terms of broad emissions reductions, the
current regime lacks of incentives for many of the largest emitters to participate or
comply).
Id. at 5.
111.
The leading climate change bill in Congress was sponsored by Republican
112.
John McCain and Independent Joe Lieberman in 2003, but now most Republicans
won't go anywhere near a climate change bill. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns; The
PoliticalScene, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70, 70-80. Other bills also failed. See
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
713(a)(2)(B)(ii) (adopting threshold of 25,000 metric tons CO2eq annually); Clean Jobs
and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 713 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (2009) (same);
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. Res. 2191, 110th Cong., § 1112
(1)(A)(iii) (2008) (adopting threshold of 10,000 metric tons of CO2eq).

113.

Jonathan Adams, China's Climate Change Talks: What's Changed Since

Copenhagen?, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1005/China-s-climate-change-talks-What-s-changedsince-Copenhagen.
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The lack of success of flexibility could perhaps be explained by
various economics principles.11 4 Perhaps the cognitive costs or
transaction costs are simply too high for each nation to determine
how to meet an obligation." 5 It is easier to debate away the
obligation entirely. The American phenomenon of climate change
"denialism" could also be a tragedy of cognitive costs-it is simply
easier to believe climate change is not happening when it seems that
nothing will fix the problem." 6 At the national and international
level, cognitive costs can translate to elections, policy debates, costbenefit analysis, political campaigns, and vast amounts of lobbying
money. Another economics principle that could explain this problem
is hyperbolic discounting. People always put a premium on a benefit
today, like money, over a benefit at any point in the future.1 17 More
flexibility allows for exacerbation of this problem because people have
no commitment device."18
These problems run throughout the very structure of the current
system. What this all means is that the international community can
begin to reconsider some of the basic assumptions behind the
prevailing mitigation strategy. Is it really necessary for a single
treaty to try to solve the entire climate change problem at once or
could incremental improvement be more successful in the end? Is
endless flexibility for signatory nations helpful or will it save
cognitive costs and simplify the response to lay out the strategies in

See, e.g., Carbon Footprint, supra note 81 (noting the lack of success of
114.
current negotiations based on similar flexible strategies because of issues such as lack
of political will, complexity, economic concerns, and fairness).
115.
Id.
116.
Other possible theories behind the "denialism" phenomenon are lobbyist
and industry influence, personal convictions, limitations of national infrastructure and
financial resources, and downright conspiracy. "The corporate lobbies that organize
climate-change-denial campaigns are lavishly financed, outspending those supporting
urgent action by 7 to 1. One result is the $550 billion a year in subsidies that the
International Energy Agency estimates go to the fossil fuel sector of the energy
industry." Mikhail Gorbachev, Let's Get Serious About Climate Talks, INT'L. HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 4, 2010, at 14. There is evidence that one's "belief"in climate change hinges
on one's world view. Christopher Joyce, Belief in Climate Change Hinges on Worldview,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=124008307. "Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are
settled, their views about climate change will change accordingly. Therefore, you need
to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the debate, and
defer to scientists and other experts in the field." Frank Luntz, The Environment:
Cleaner, Safer, HealthierAmerica, in LUNTz RESEARCH COMPANIES: STRAIGHT TALK
131, 137 (2002), available at http://www.ewg.org/files/LuntzResearch-environment.pdf.
117.
See Julie Rehmeyer, 'Discounting'the Future Cost of Climate Change, Scl.
NEWS (May 21, 2010), http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/59509/title/Math
TrekDiscountingthe -future cost of climatechange (explaining time preferences
and hyperbolic discounting in the climate change context).
118.
See, e.g., Gharad Bryan et al., Commitment Devices, 2 ANN. REV. ECON.
671, 674 (2010).
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the international forum? Are there ways to design a system of
negotiation to increase the likelihood of agreement? Could an
alternative structure fix some of these problems?
IV. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT WITH AN ALTERNATIVE

STRUCTURE: THE WTO MODEL
The nations of the world are in a position where climate change
mitigation goals are still desirable, but the simplest and most flexible
policy of broad, global emissions caps has not worked and may never
work."19 It is time for the world to begin looking for other ways to
achieve mitigation policy goals. Designers of the new model should
certainly reconsider the basic assumptions behind the prevailing
climate change mitigation strategy and account for the structural
failures of the system, but they should go beyond this. Climate
change is a time sensitive issue,120 and trial and error is not the
preferable method for creating a solution. To increase the likelihood
of success on the next attempt, policymakers should look to other
successful international policies and consider whether certain other
techniques could solve the climate change puzzle.
This Note uses the World Trade Organization (WTO) model as a
lens through which to consider how an alternative structure might
work in the climate change context. 121 The WTO model is not a
perfect parallel; the WTO addresses a free trade goal,' 22 which
inherently has different problems and incentives than the climate
change mitigation goal. But the WTO model uses an interesting
structure that could potentially work in other contexts. The WTO
model is complicated, but a closer look reveals an elegant design
structure that could potentially work in the climate change context. A
few structural features of the WTO model are particularly relevant
for the climate change context, given the failures of the existing
system: first, the WTO model allows for incremental change over
time;123 second, the WTO model uses separate categories for the
various strategies for achieving the free trade goal and treats each

119.
See Broder, supra note 84.
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 18, pt. 4.
120.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
121.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
122.
Id. art. 2(1).
See G. GREGORY LE'TIERMAN, BASICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF
123.
CUSTOMS AND TARIFFS 41 (2001) (explaining that the WTO is not a fixed result, but a
continuing process of interim negotiations and adjustments).
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category as functionally and practically distinct; 124 and third, the
WTO model allows for certain issues within each category to be
separately negotiated. 125
The WTO model is a system of interconnected international
agreements with a long history. 126 The WTO was established in 1995
to administer the new General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, or
"GATT 1994."127 GATT 1994 replaced and advanced the same basic
principles as the original GATT 1947.128 The policy goals of GATT

1947 and GATT 1994 are the same, but the current WTO model and
structure exists under GATT 1994.
GATT 1947, as well as GATT 1994, was a multilateral treaty
system intended to meet the policy goals of expanding and
liberalizing international trade.12 9 These basic free trade goals were
expected to secure the terms of world trade and to reform the
formerly protectionist world of international commerce. 8 0 The
mechanisms employed by GATT 1947 and the new WTO model to
achieve these goals through can be expressed in four founding
principles: trade must be conducted in a non-discriminatory way;
imported items are not to be treated differently than domestic
products once imported; domestic industry should only be given
protection through customs tariffs; and each member-party must
negotiate a maximum tariff schedule to become a member.'13
These goals and principles appear deceptively simple. In fact,
GATT 1947 had 126 states as parties and ultimately consisted of over
200 agreements, protocols, understandings, and other such
documents.132 Four "framework agreements" automatically bound all
members, while many other agreements only applied to those nations
that specifically agreed to be bound.' 33 Eight successive multilateral
negotiations gradually refined the rules and reduced barriers to
trade.134 The last of these, the "Uruguay Round" resulted in GATT

124.
See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9
(showing goods, services, and intellectual property as three distinct categories of
agreements).
125.
Id.; see LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 36 (explaining that the WTO system
uses focused negotiating rounds and even allows nations to individual commitments).
126.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
127.
WTO Agreement, supra note 121; JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION
OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 56 (2006).
BARTON ET AL., supra note 127, at 5-6; LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 39128.
41.
BARTON ET AL., supra note 127, at 5; LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 32-33.
129.
130.
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 33.
131.
Id. at 37-38.
132.
Id. at 33.
133.
Id. at 36-37.
134.
Id. at 36.
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1994 and the new WTO model as a package deal. 3 5 The new model
makes some major structural changes.136 It now binds all WTO
members by integrating most of the agreements, it integrates the
dispute mechanism and reporting requirements into the system, and
it addresses the "free rider" problem by forcing developing countries
to adhere to the free trade principles with fewer exceptions. 3 7
The current WTO structure is a system of over sixty agreements
that fall into six major categories: an umbrella agreement
establishing the WTO, separate agreements for each of three areas
that the WTO system covers (goods, services, and intellectual
property), dispute settlement, and trade policy review.' 3 8 Each broad
area has its own category of agreements: broad principles
agreements, extra agreements and annexes, and detailed schedules of
commitments for each nation.1 39 GATT is now the broad principles
agreement for the goods area.140 The General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) is the broad principles agreement for the services
area.141 And the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) is the broad principles agreement for the intellectual
property area (although this category has no additional parts at this
time).142 A graph best explains this structure:

Id. at 36, 39-41.
135.
Id. at 41.
136.
Id.
137.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supranote 9.
138.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 1, para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994,
141.
1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]; Understanding the WTO: The AgreementsOverview, supranote 9.
142.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1,
para. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Understanding the
WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.

2011]

Figure

A NEW SYSTEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE TREATIES

1437

1143

The first structural feature that is particularly relevant to the
climate change problem is that the WTO model allows incremental
improvement.144 Though the WTO model has one ultimate policy goal
of free trade, 145 an entire system of agreements is geared toward
achieving this goal.146 Each agreement represents a step in the
direction of the ultimate policy goal. For example, the GATS
establishes the basic principles by which nations are to conduct trade
in services. 147 This agreement does not reflect the whole of what is
necessary to achieve free trade, nor even the whole of what is
necessary to achieve free trade in regard to services. 148 Even the
WTO agreement, which resulted from the eighth negotiation round,
contemplates further negotiation to liberalize trade.149
Allowing for incremental change has clear advantages in the
WTO context. By using policies that do not necessarily accomplish the

143.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
144.
See supra note 123.
145.
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 33.
146.
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
147.
GATS, supra note 141, art. 1, para. 1.
148.
See, e.g., Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9
(showing other agreements under the "services" category).
149.
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 40.
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end goal on their own, the WTO model treats any progress toward
free trade as real progress and has ultimately achieved far greater
success than the original negotiations in the 1940s could have
achieved.150 GATT 1947 was originally intended to be an interim
agreement, but it facilitated trade liberalization for decades and
provided real solutions. 15 GATT 1947 did not include many of the
originally intended features, but nations still treated the agreement
as a worthwhile policy. 152 These ever-changing interim agreements
and other plurilateral agreements that only bound the parties that
agreed to them often served as "as an intermediate way station on the
road to multilateral acceptance." 5 3 The result of this structural
feature is what scholars call the "ratchet effect": once WTO members
agree on a contentious issue, the issue becomes less contentious and
parties move on to the next issue, never un-agreeing to the original
issue. 154 The consensus that the international community has slowly
built over the past six decades shows that it is possible to build
momentum for consensus. 155 As any good sales person knows, one
"yes" leads to another.
The second useful structural insight that is relevant to the
climate change context is the WTO's use of separate categories for
various strategies for achieving free trade.156 Unlike current climate
change policies that create a single, flexible emissions cap, the WTO
system uses completely separate categories of agreements for sectors
that are functionally unique.157 While trade in goods, under the basic
principles of GATT, was the only category incorporated into the
system for many decades,' 5 8 a services category was later added

150.
Id. at 33 (noting that although GATT 1947 was not perfect, it "did a
remarkably good job of reforming what had, at its inception, been a very protectionist
world," and that during its reign average tariffs fell from 40 percent to 5 percent, while
the volume of international trade in good multiplied twenty-fold).
151.
BARTON ET AL., supra note 127, at 5.
152.
See LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 34 (explaining that GATT 1947 was "a
treaty without its planned administering organization and which covered only a part of
its originally intended scope," but that it attracted twenty-three signatories at its
origin).
153.
Id. at 56-57.
154.
Handbook on Accession to the WTO: Introduction and Summary, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acce/cbtcourse e/introe.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) (explaining the ratchet effect); see also LETTERMAN, supra note
123, at 41 (noting that some issues that were contentious when GATT 1947 was
enacted gradually became less important).
155.
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 40-41 (noting the evolution over time).
156.
See supra note 124.
157.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
158.
GATT 1947, which regulated trade in goods, existed until it was replaced
with GATT 1994. LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 33-35. GATS, which regulates trade
in services, did not exist until 1995. See GATS, supra note 141, art. 1, 1 1.
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under GATS, 159 and an intellectual property category was added
under TRIPS.' 60 The system also has four unique categories that
consist only of plurilateral agreements that do not apply to all WTO
members. 16 1 Operating under the general principles, each category
has its own system of extra agreements, annexes, and commitment
schedules. 162 For example, the goods category has an array of
agreements on such things as agriculture, anti-dumping, and rules of
origin. 16

In part, the various categories of the WTO system are a side
effect of the historical coming of age of different sectors at different
times. For example, the goods regime came at a time when most trade
occurred in goods, developing through decades of negotiation
rounds.164 Eventually, services also played a key part in free trade. 165
A large share of foreign trade was in services itself and trade in goods
to services provided across borders. 166 The WTO model allows the
corresponding international regulatory regime to come of age at a
pace appropriate for the sector. The goods category now includes a
well-developed system under GATT.' 6 7 In contrast, the services
category, under the general principles of GATS is in its infancy.1 68
Many types of services are still not covered by the treaty and
negotiations continue on many aspects of services trade. 169 The
intellectual property category, under TRIPS, is even less developed,
currently consisting only of the broad principles category. 170 These
sectors are also functionally different and have different issues
associated with them; thus they must be treated differently."'7 The
WTO model provides the flexibility to treat each sector separately
based on these differences.
The third structural feature of the WTO model that is
particularly relevant for the climate change problem is the ability of
the system to allow for give and take within each categorical sector

159.
GATS, supra note 141; Understanding the WTO: The AgreementsOverview, supra note 9.
160.
TRIPS, supra note 142, art. 1, 2.
161.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
162.
Id.
163.
WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal e/legal-e.htm#GATT94 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
See LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 36 (explaining that the GATT regime
164.
was tweaked through numerous rounds of negotiation).
BARTON ET AL., supra note 127, at 127.
165.
166.
Id.
167.
WTO Legal Texts, supra note 163.
168.
BARTON ET AL., supra note 127, at 129.
Id.
169.
170.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
171.
See id. (listing various "additional details" that fall under the goods and
services categories).
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and for certain issues within each category to be separately
negotiated. 172 Every sector category of agreements (goods, services,
etc.) contains additional agreements and annexes that work out
certain details. 73 For example, the goods category of agreements has
separately negotiated agreements for trade in agriculture, for health
regulations of farm products, and for anti-dumping issues.1 74 The
goods category also has a host of "interpretive understandings"
covering such issues as balance-of-payment provisions and waivers of
obligations.' 7 5 Each category even has an array of separate
commitment schedules for participating nations. 176 In the goods
category, for example, the schedules consist of binding commitments
on tariffs and quotas. 77 In the services category, these schedules
address how much access a foreign services provider has to specific
sectors.' 7 8
The benefit of this feature is that any issue that can stand alone
can be separately negotiated in isolation of all other issues. The
continuing negotiation process means that policymakers can add new
agreements or new terms to each category without making major
changes to the overall system.' 7 9 In short, the continual negotiation
process simplifies any particular negotiation and facilitates the
gradual consensus discussed above. If an agreement on the details of
trade in agriculture does not implicate trade in building materials, for
example, then policymakers may improve the negotiation strategy by
not discussing building materials in the agriculture negotiation. Of
course, policymakers may find that combining certain issues into a
single negotiation has strategic advantages. This may be what led to
the WTO model's use of general principles agreements that establish
basic principles for all other agreements in the category.1 80

172.
Id.; see also LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 36 (explaining that the WTO
system uses focused negotiating rounds and even allows nations to selectively commit
to certain obligations).
173.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
174.
Id.; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex lA, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (separate agreement
establishing a category of agreements for trades in goods).
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 42.
175.
176.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
Id.
177.
178.
Id.
179.
See LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 41 (explaining that the WTO system is
designed as a continuing process).
180.
See id. at 37-38 (outlining the four essential principles underlying both
GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement).
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V. THREE MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES COULD SAVE
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION

The three core structural features of the WTO modelaccommodating incremental change over time, creating separate
agreement categories for various sectors to be treated differently, and
allowing certain issues within each category to be separately
negotiated-could work quite well in the climate change mitigation
context. Indeed, some version of such strategic structural changes to
the current climate change mitigation strategy could help solve some
of the major failures of the current approach.' 8 '

A. Incremental GHG Reduction: The Mitigation Turtle,
Not the Mitigation Hare
In designing a new system for climate change mitigation,
policymakers should follow the WTO example and pursue
incremental reduction in GHG emissions rather than attempt to
achieve all necessary reductions at one time. Such a policy shift in
climate change mitigation techniques would both resolve some of the
issues exhibited by the current prevailing technique and would allow
for similar benefits to those realized in the WTO context.
Recall that the current model underestimates the dramatically
large scope of the task of reaching climate change mitigation
targets.182 It hardly seems wise to attempt to solve the entire world
climate change problem with a single emissions cap.18 3 If the system
were to allow for incremental reduction in GHG emissions, the world
would not have to make an "all or nothing" choice. Such a system
would also allow for adjustment based on success. If one of several
incremental strategies works better than others, then future
increments could focus on those strategies that actually work.
A strategy that seeks incremental change would also fit better
into the climate change mitigation goal, based on risk profiles. 8 4
Such incremental reduction in GHG emissions would achieve real
mitigation, meaning risk reduction, with every increment. An
example best illustrates this point. Suppose current projections,
based on current growth rates and emissions rates, suggest that
atmospheric levels of CO2eq will reach 650 ppm by 2050. At this

See supra Part III.B (discussing the shortcomings of the current regime to
181.
address climate change).
182.
See supra Part III.B.
See Barrett, supra note 4, at 1 (arguing that climate change is too
183.
fundamental a problem to address it with a net emissions reduction such as that in the
Kyoto regime).
184.
See supraPart III.B.
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level, there is a 100 percent probability of a 2oC increase and a 24
percent chance of a 50C increase in the global average surface
temperature.18 5 If a particular increment or group of increments
reduced current projections to 550 ppm CO2eq, the risk would shift to
a 99 percent chance of a 20C increase and a 7 percent chance of a 50C
increase in global average surface temperature. 186 With this
incremental reduction in emissions, the likelihood of a 20C increase
hardly changes, but the likelihood of a 5oC increase, a number
associated with a far greater degree of catastrophe, 18 7 decreases
significantly. Thus the reduction reduces the ultimate risk of
catastrophic climate change. Like with free trade in the WTO model,
partial progress toward the ultimate mitigation goal may represent
real progress.' 8 8
An incremental policy in the climate change context could also
lead to the same ratchet effect experienced in the WTO context.189
There are several possible explanations for why incremental
emissions reductions could increase the likelihood of further
emissions reductions. Success of initial emissions reductions could
prove the effectiveness of such policies and build confidence in the
feasibility of mitigation strategies. Additionally, if parties to an
incremental agreement comply with obligations, it would be a sign of
good faith to other parties that each member is serious about climate
change mitigation, thus increasing confidence in compliance with
potential future agreements.
Another way to think about the possible benefits of an
incremental climate change mitigation strategy is to think of it as a
commitment device. Under economic models of human time
preferences, most people would prefer benefits now, such as more
money or cheaper resources, to a benefit in the distant future.19 0 This
is true under the traditional economic concept of exponential
discounting, which assumes that a person cares more about each time
period than about the time period immediately after it; but it is also
true in the possibly more accurate concept of hyperbolic discounting,
which assumes that people put a premium on the current time period
while hardly distinguishing between benefits at various times in the

185.
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 19, at 318 tbl.1.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
See STERN, supra note 5, at 195 box 8.1 (showing the broad range of risk
associated with various CO2eq targets).
189.
See Handbook on Accession to the WTO, supra note 154 (explaining that
there has been something of a ratchet effect since the early beginnings of the WTO
regime).
190.
See Rehmeyer, supra note 117 (explaining time preferences and hyperbolic
discounting in the climate change context).
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future.19 1 This means that most people procrastinate doing things
such as addressing climate change that will produce future benefits
because they always think it is better to "spend nothing to combat
climate change now, but start to do so real soon, in that mythical
future time when we acquire patience."1 92 A commitment device is an
arrangement in which a person makes something in the present more
''expensive" in order to change the relationship between a benefit in
the present and a benefit in the future.'9 3 Essentially, it locks a
person into a course of action so that procrastination is not an option.
Once an increment of mitigation is realized, the world would be
locked into a course of action and any failure to realize enough
mitigation to reduce the risk of climate change would forfeit the
expense paid for the initial increment. 194 Additionally, with an
incremental climate change mitigation strategy, each successive
agreement to achieve an increment of GHG reduction would alter the
''cost" of current benefits such that the relationship between the
present and the future do not produce such drastic procrastination
responses.
Some final potential benefits to an incremental GHG reduction
policy are timing and appropriate regulation. Complex change to
technology or infrastructure necessary to achieve substantial climate
change mitigation will take time to implement.'9 5 Policies with shortterm results could be implemented in the near-term, potentially at
lower cost, reducing the global risk and buying time for the longerterm solutions. 96 The incremental solution could also potentially
help avoid over-regulation because once enough mitigation is
achieved, there will be no need to continue adding additional
regulations.

191.
Id.
192.
Id. See generally Larry Karp & Yacov Tsur, Climate Policy When the
Distant Future Matters: Catastrophic Events with Hyperbolic Discounting (Feb. 2,
2007) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=961045&download=yes (providing another analysis on the
economics of choice theory in the climate change context).
193.
See, e.g., Bryan et al., supra note 118, at 3 (providing a definition of a
commitment device). In the economic context, the term "expensive" is often used to
describe time or cognitive costs and not simply financial cost. See id. at 5-6 (listing
several commitment devices involving time or cognitive costs rather than purely
financial costs).
194.
This would be similar to a "hard commitment" in which failure is punished
with real economic penalties. See id. at 2.
195.
Dietz et al., supra note 59, at 18,452.
196.
Id.
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B. Categories of Mitigation Strategies that Establish
the Methods for GHG Reduction
Climate change policymakers should also follow the WTO
example by creating separate agreement categories for various
mitigation strategies. This would be the first step in providing
practical answers for how to achieve mitigation, rather than simply
specifying a general emissions cap.' 9 7 As becomes clear below, the
potential methods of mitigation are known, as is the fact that more
than one method is required to reach mitigation targets. The world
would do well to codify these methods and begin to discern principles
and techniques for pursuing them.
One way to create distinct mitigation categories would be to
divide the system by the many sources that contribute to global GHG
emissions. In 2000, GHG emissions came from electricity generation
(24 percent), industry (14 percent), transportation (14 percent),
buildings (8 percent), and other energy related sources (5 percent).' 9 8
Non-energy related sources contributed GHG emissions as well
through land use (18 percent), agriculture (14 percent), and waste (3
percent).19 9 This prompts some fairly simple comparisons to the WTO
model. Energy, as such a large source of GHG emissions, could be
viewed as a parallel to goods in the WTO context. A climate change
mitigation policy could treat energy as its own category of
agreements. It could also treat electricity generation, transportation,
and industry each as separate categories of agreements.
Another, and probably better, way to create distinct mitigation
categories would be to divide the system into the types of mitigation
strategies. Because of the scope of the mitigation task, 200 the
international community will have to employ multiple methods to
reduce GHG emissions.2 0 1 The various methods may warrant
different and separate international approaches and could easily be
conceptualized as separate categories in a system similar to the WTO
model.

197.
See supra Part III.B.
198.
STERN, supra note 5, at 171 fig.7.1; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2008, at 2-26
(2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/cimatechangelemissions/usinventoryreport.html
(showing that the largest portions of U.S. emissions come from electricity generation
and transportation).
199.
STERN, supra note 5 at 171.
200.
Lewis, supra note 6, at 15.
201.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 968-70 (noting that seven climate
change wedges are necessary to achieve stabilization).
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The possible types of mitigation methods were explored in detail
202
by Pacala and Socolow, who coined the term "stabilization wedge."
The "wedge" takes its name from the graphical representation of the
concept. 203 The difference between no increase in GHG emissions (a
flat line on a graph) and an increase in GHG emissions at the current
rate (a diagonal line on a graph) creates a triangle. 20 4 The "wedges"
represent one gigaton of carbon per year of reduced carbon emissions
in fifty years. 205 According to the authors, seven "wedges" would
achieve a roughly 600 ppm CO2eq target. 206 Seven years have passed
since the article was published, so the actual number of wedges
required may be slightly higher by now. 207 The authors also describe
fifteen different possible "wedges" that can be achieved with current
technology. 20 8 The fifteen wedges fall into three distinct categories:
efficiency and conservation, decarbonization of electricity and fuels,
and natural sinks (i.e., forest and soil management).2 09 Thus, each of
these three categories could make up a separate category of
agreements in a larger mitigation system similar to the sector
categories in the WTO model.
Several other benefits could potentially result from separating
categories of mitigation methods this way. While the climate itself is
agnostic as to what sector of the economy the GHG reductions should
come from, certain types of emissions reductions may be practically
easier to achieve. Energy conservation, for example, is cheaper and
produces more immediate results than decarbonizing electricity and
fuels. 2 10 Therefore, a category of agreements on conservation could be
implemented more quickly and more aggressively than other
categories. An added benefit of this method is that mitigation could
begin in one category while the others are not yet resolved, thereby
achieving incremental GHG reductions as advocated above and
buying time for progress through the other categories.

202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.

205.
Id.
Id. Pacala and Socolow's target of 500 ppm C02 is roughly equivalent to
206.
600 ppm CO2eq. IPCC WORKING GROUP III, supra note 1, at 39 tbl.TS.2.
Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7.
207.
208.
Id. at 970 thl.1.
209.
Id. at 970-72.
See Dietz et al., supra note 59, at 18,452-53 (pointing out that behavioral
210.
changes in conservation can achieve quick results at a low cost).
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C. Improving FeasibilityThrough a Strategy of
Key Negotiation Components
As explained in Part 111.3, one of the biggest problems with the
current strategy for climate change mitigation is the failure of
continuing negotiation and compliance.2 11 Nations do not want to
commit to further vague and amorphous emissions caps. 212
Policymakers could significantly improve the negotiation strategy by
following the WTO model of allowing for certain components to be
negotiated separately within each mitigation category. This is similar
to, but not the same as allowing for incremental change. Individual
separately negotiated components will not necessarily achieve any
GHG reduction on their own. Rather, the purpose of negotiating
components separately is to improve the negotiation strategy and to
correct the political infeasibility problem.2 18 This will only work if
done the right way, which will require a consideration of which
components should be negotiated together and which should be
negotiated separately to achieve the optimal improvement in the
negotiation strategy.
Three potential aspects stand out as potential areas for strategic
negotiation components: general principles, technical agreements
that establish realistically achievable reductions through various
means, and burden allocation. It is important to note at the outset of
this suggestion that these components are not necessarily dependent
on one another for negotiation purposes. They are separate issues
that can be treated separately. Additionally, and more importantly,
separating these components could have strategically beneficial
advantages that could help solve some of the more sticky feasibility
issues.
This strategy could help the feasibility problem by narrowing the
debate, reducing the cognitive costs of each particular agreement. A
nation is more likely to be able to agree on a simple "basic principles
of energy conservation" policy than on a policy that limits emissions
across the entire economy. If the immediate negotiation solely
concerns maximum achievable emissions reductions through clean
coal, then there is little reason for the oil lobby to get involved in the
debate. This solution would also reduce the cognitive costs of meeting

See supra Part III.B.
211.
212.
See Carbon Footprint, supra note 81 (noting a desire to move away from
past negotiation strategies); see also Kate Galbraith, Getting Past the Politics of
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/
business/energy-environment/04green.html?scp=1&sq=gettingpastthepoliticsofclimate
change&st=cse (suggesting that nations are posed to act, but noting that other
countries may give up on the United States' participation).
213.
See supra Part III.B.
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an obligation once nations agree to it because the general principles
for each strategy and the maximum achievable reduction through
each means will already be established.
Another reason this could help the political feasibility problem is
that it would help create better incentives for nations to commit and
to meet commitments. Once basic principles and maximum
achievable reductions are established, all that is left for nations to
negotiate is which nation will make which reduction through what
means. Burden allocation alone is a much simpler issue; removing
technical feasibility and theoretical differences from the equation
puts the focus on the narrow issue of whether a nation is willing to do
its share. But this solution can go beyond narrowing by actually
combining issues strategically in what this proposal refers to as "hogtrading." Once the options are real and tangible, the negotiations can
come down to what nation A is willing to do in exchange for nation
B's commitment. This shift could change the entire tragedy of the
commons situation in the climate change mitigation context.
Finally, this solution allows for gradual consensus in the way
that incremental change allows for gradual mitigation. Each new
agreement will have a similar ratchet effect to the one explained
above. If it becomes clear that the world is serious about resolving
issues and about making progress, then it would become a more
settled idea in the world psyche and perhaps public opinion would
adapt accordingly.
Ultimately, for a climate change mitigation policy to succeed,
both politically and functionally, it may be necessary to break it up
into manageable chunks. The WTO model shows how the world could
do this. By allowing for incremental mitigation, by creating categories
of agreements for the various mitigation strategies, and by creating
negotiation components within each strategy, policymakers can
create a climate change mitigation system that achieves actual
mitigation and builds support for additional progress.
VI. UNVEILING THE WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE ORGANIZATION
TO ADMINISTER A BOLD NEW MITIGATION STRATEGY

It should be clear by now that the international community
should abandon the failed emissions cap method of climate change
mitigation policy and begin considering other approaches. With the
above analysis and insights in hand, it is now possible to design a
new international system for climate change mitigation. The new
approach, dubbed the World Climate Change Organization model,
would encompass a system of international climate change mitigation
agreements using these three structural changes explained in the
previous section: incremental emissions reduction, categories of
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mitigation strategies, and separation of key components for
negotiation strategy.
The system idea per se is not new. In a way, the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol are systematic. The UNFCCC establishes an
obligation for parties to negotiate further agreements on climate
change mitigation. 214 It is an agreement to agree at a later date. The
UNFCCC structure is very loose, however, and as is now evident, has
had limited success.21 5 Nor is the concept of using a collection of
separate agreements that cover different issues a new idea. Another
structure idea, dubbed the "portfolio approach" was proposed by Scott
Barrett. 216 Barrett suggests a linked collection of agreements that
cover various economic sectors, gases, and alternative mitigation
means like geo-engineering. 217 He argues that the portfolio approach
is a good idea because if efforts in one sector fail, efforts in other
sectors would not be "pulled down with it."2 18 However, Barrett does
not provide further details or explain how the system would work.
The new mitigation system proposed here and explained in full
detail below is different from these other approaches as it
encompasses an entire system-a complete framework for
international agreement on and regulation of climate change
mitigation. The new system idea differs in other respects as well. It is
based on the fundamental idea that functional decoupling of issues is
the best way to get past the current climate change gridlock. By
breaking parts such as mitigation and negotiation into manageable
chunks and allowing binding, long-term agreement even though
future negotiation remains necessary, the new system would prevent
the perfect from being the enemy of the good. The new system idea is
also rooted in some of the leading analysis on the climate change
puzzle. Risk insights and climate change wedges are unique to
climate change mitigation and the new system would account for
them. Finally, the proposed system is modeled on an existing
international regime that works. The WTO model has been
facilitating free trade policy for over six decades. 219 Through that
time, it has been continually tweaked and improved.2 20 A long-lasting
system that allows continual revision and improvement toward the

214.
See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 11, art. 4(2)(d) (pledging to review and
modify commitments already made); see also Barrett, supra note 4, at 1 (describing the
"linear"structure to the current regime in which the UNFCCC establishes a long-term
goal while Kyoto establishes a commitment under it).
See Barrett, supra note 4, at 1-2 (criticizing the minimal progress of the
215.
current regime).
216.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
217.
Id. at 8.
218.
LETTERMAN, supra note 123, at 33.
219.
Id. at 36.
220.
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mitigation goal is precisely what is required in the climate change
context.
A. How the World Climate Change OrganizationModel Would Work
This Note ultimately endorses the creation of a new
international body called the World Climate Change Organization
(WCCO) to administer the pursuit and development of multilateral
agreements under each of three categories of climate change
mitigation strategies: energy decarbonization, efficiency and
conservation, and natural sinks. 221 Within each strategy, certain
components should be individually and separately negotiated in the
following order: (1) agreements on general principles for each
mitigation strategy category (e.g., basic principles for energy
decarbonization), (2) technical agreements for realistically achievable
GHG reductions through all the means within a category (e.g.,
maximum achievable reductions through coal decarbonization), and
(3) "hog-trading" agreements where nations negotiate individual
obligations in exchange for other nations' obligations (e.g., the United
States agrees to achieve X reduction through coal decarbonization
while China agrees to achieve Y reduction through clean vehicles). All
of these categories, agreements, and components should exist under
an umbrella treaty that establishes the WCCO and facilitates the
administration of agreements under the overarching treaty. Although
not explored in detail, the WCCO system could also include some
other features of the WTO model such as compliance or dispute
resolution and reporting and transparency mechanisms.22 2 The
structure of the new WCCO system of agreements would look
something like the following:

221.
These three categories of mitigation strategies reflect the three categories
of techniques explained in the climate change wedge theories. See Pacala & Socolow,
supra note 7, at 969.

222.

Understanding the WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9. Kyoto

has some teeth, but some argue that it is not effective. Barrett, supra note 4, at 4-5
(noting particularly its lack of any enforcement mechanism).
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The umbrella treaty that creates the WCCO would be the best
tool for ensuring that the system allows for incremental mitigation.
This would work similarly to the current WTO structure, in which the
umbrella WTO Agreement establishes the free trade goal as well as
ongoing negotiation targets for continuing trade liberalization. 224
Similarly, the WCCO umbrella treaty would establish both an
ultimate mitigation target as well as the immediate goal of
incremental mitigation. The ultimate mitigation target could be 450
ppm CO2eq or even 650 ppm CO2eq, depending on which goal the
scientists find feasible and the policymakers find digestible. The
incremental goals should be based on digestible and feasible chunks.
Like the WTO model, the WCCO umbrella agreement should also
provide a structure under which all other agreements should fit and
establish the WCCO itself as the entity to facilitate negotiation and
agreement. 225

223.
in Part IV,
224.
225.

This chart is based on the WTO agreement structure chart that is included
supra.
WTO Agreement, supra note 121, pmbl.
See id. arts. 2-3.
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Dividing the WCCO system by the three mitigation
and
(2) efficiency
energy decarbonization,
components-(1)
conservation, and (3) natural sinks-would help to establish the
means of mitigation. These strategies are each distinct, and it is not
necessary to treat them the same. This sort of separation is successful
in the WTO model, which separates goods, services, and intellectual
property into different categories and treats each category differently
under a different set of general principles.2 2 6 One benefit of using the
climate change "wedges" for the categories rather than other options
is that it allows policy to be built around a type of solution instead of
around the problem itself.2 27 The conservation category may seem
surprising because little international debate covers conservation, yet
there seems to be no good reason for ignoring such low-hanging
fruit. 228 Nations could easily implement conservation programs
through technology development, infrastructure changes, citizen
education, and incentives. 22 9 The conservation "wedges," for example,
are improved fuel economy, reduced reliance on cars, more efficient
buildings, and improved power plant efficiency. 230 There may also be
a fifth "behavioral wedge" that includes policies for incentivizing
changes in energy usage. 23 ' Indeed, many conservation methods will
no doubt be easier, quicker and less expensive than other
categories. 232 By including the efficiency and conservation strategy as
a unique category under the WCCO, the system would signal that
such a strategy is important and would facilitate possibly less costly
means of GHG reduction.
This WCCO system would improve the political feasibility
problem by establishing separate negotiations for certain
components, namely general principles, maximum achievable
allocation
and
"hog-trading" burden
reductions,
emissions
agreements. This structural change would work slightly differently
from, though similar to and using the same basic principle, as the
WTO model. The WTO model uses general principles agreements for
each category. 233 GATS, for example, establishes general principles
for the services category, including basic rules for things like mostfavored nation treatment, transparency, and disclosure of confidential
information. 234 Each category in the WTO model has many separate

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 970-71.
Dietz et al., supra note 59, at 18,454.
Id. at 18,452.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 970.
Dietz et al., supra note 59, at 18,452.
Id.
Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
GATS, supra note 141, arts. 1-3.
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agreements covering details within the category.2 35 Finally, each
category includes commitment schedules for each member. 236 In the
WCCO system, the general principles agreements would similarly
establish basic rules for that particular mitigation strategy. A
conservation general principles agreement for the efficiency and
conservation category, for example, could include basic rules for
seeking conservation through technological development or funding
for infrastructure. Rather than following the WTO example for the
other agreements, however, the WCCO system would only have two
other types of agreements: those establishing technical achievability
for GHG reductions and those where nations engage in hog-trading
burden allocation. This would separate technical feasibility from
actual commitment, taking one potential excuse out of the
commitment discussion. With the hog-trading agreements specifically
considering clear, established reductions through specific means, the
negotiations could get a little bit more nuanced based on things like
infrastructure and age of the existing system in each nation. More
importantly, the negotiations could begin to work like functional
markets, where obligations are exchanged for other obligations.
The benefits of the WCCO mitigation system are numerous.
Because the new system would break many of the component parts
into manageable chunks, negotiation and solutions could be more
streamlined and the lobbying influence would be less significant for
each portion. As agreements gradually go into effect, the world would
begin to make progress on climate change mitigation and reduce the
risk of catastrophic climate change sufficiently to buy time for
agreement on more complicated issues. As nations agree to various
issues, political momentum would build for more agreement through
the sheer power of saying yes. Each agreement would have a ratchet
effect in which progress already made would become difficult to
negate. Rules for each type of issue could be tailored around the
specific category or mitigation method. It is even possible that some of
the policies would be more immediately viable because they have
certain intrinsic benefits beyond climate change mitigation. For
example, due to the projected increase in energy demand, more
energy sources will be necessary regardless of climate change
mitigation needs.2 37 This new energy might as well come from more
efficient sources, while benefitting the economy of nations that
develop and export the new technology.

235.
236.
237.

Understandingthe WTO: The Agreements-Overview, supra note 9.
Id.
Lewis, supra note 6, at 16.
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B. Building on Existing Progress:Integratingthe UNFCCC
into the World Climate Change Organization
The UNFCCC is little more than recognition of climate change
and an agreement that parties should do something about remedying
the problem. 238 It purports to be a complete policy with principles for
how to achieve climate change mitigation, but the actual
commitments are couched in soft terms like "promote" and
"cooperate."2 39 The supposed commitments consist of things like
adopting national policies to limit GHGs. 240 It basically sets goals and
describes the problem, much in the way that a general principles
agreement might set goals and targets under the WCCO system. In
essence, it is really an umbrella agreement, contemplating future
agreements, the first of which is the Kyoto Protocol.
The WTO Agreement is also an umbrella agreement that sets
goals and describes the problem. First, it recognizes the goal of free
trade. 24 1 But it also establishes that the WTO will provide a common
institutional framework for trade related conduct of its members for
legal instruments under the system. 242 It sets forth details for how
the WTO will operate. 243 It also sets procedures for the negotiations
of future agreements by members within the WTO system. 244 This
agreement establishes the entire WTO system and the rules of
procedure. It is a set of rules about making rules. It does not attempt
to specify methods for meeting the free trade goals or set up specific
commitments, nor does it cover enforcement mechanisms. All of those
issues are resolved elsewhere in agreements that fall under this
system.
While the UNFCCC has part of what is required in a WCCO
umbrella agreement, it does not have everything that is needed.
Thus, the first step in creating the new WCCO system is to amend
the UNFCCC so that it more appropriately administers the WCCO
system. The amended agreement should keep the description of the
problem and the goals. It could also include an ultimate mitigation
target and incremental goals. But the agreement should go no further
in specifying methods of mitigation or commitments. Rather, it
should establish a formal World Climate Change Organization that
will provide a common institutional framework for climate change
mitigation related conduct of its members and for legal instruments

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

UNFCCC, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 3.
Id. arts. 3, 4(1).
Id. art. 4(2)(a).
WTO Agreement, supra note 121, pmbl.
Id. art. 2.
Id. arts. 2-9.
Id. art. 10.
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under the system. Thus, it will become an organizational and
administrative document.
VII. CONCLUSION

The existing international policies for affecting climate change
mitigation have not worked and there is no indication that they will
work in the future. The policies are too broad and too vague. They
allow too much room for failure and consequently have never
generated enough political momentum toward mitigation. The
international community should abandon these failed policies and
begin developing new policies that can achieve progress toward
climate change mitigation. There is very little in the existing policy
that is salvageable beyond the climate change mitigation goal. The
rest is bogged down with political baggage. The international
community should accept this failure and the lessons it provides and
move on to a better solution. And the debate on better solutions must
begin immediately. New policies take time to implement and the
climate change clock is ticking. The longer it takes to begin
mitigation, the more difficult mitigation will be to achieve.
In designing a new climate change mitigation system, it is wise
to take note of other successful models. The WTO model is a very
suitable role model for climate change mitigation policy because while
it has one big, lofty goal-free trade-it recognizes that it is
impossible to achieve the entire goal in one fell swoop. It allows the
world to arrive at this ultimate free trade goal at different paces in
different contexts. The current WTO model took decades to achieve.
Luckily, policymakers in the climate change context can learn from
the WTO model without taking decades to get there.
The proposed international climate change mitigation system,
the WCCO, would follow the WTO model by not attempting to achieve
the ultimate mitigation target all at once, but it would achieve
incremental mitigation and would significantly increase the odds of
achieving the ultimate goal. Each successive agreement under the
system would either generate some degree of mitigation or would
improve the chance for success of a partial mitigation effort. Each
partial mitigation method would reduce the risk of catastrophic
climate changes, buying time for other mitigation methods and
building social acceptance for mitigation in general. This system will

2011)

t SYSTEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE TREATIES
A NEW

1455

allow parallel paths of progress toward the mitigation goal to proceed
at varying paces, and ultimately achieve mitigation through small
steps in the same direction.
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